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Abstract
A model to describe the spontaneous formation of military and
economic coalitions among a group of countries is proposed using spin
glass theory. Between each couple of countries, there exists a bond
exchange coupling which is either zero, cooperative or conflicting. It
depends on their common history, specific nature, and cannot be var-
ied. Then, given a frozen random bond distribution, coalitions are
found to spontaneously form. However they are also unstable making
the system very disordered. Countries shift coalitions all the time.
Only the setting of macro extra national coalition are shown to sta-
bilize alliances among countries. The model gives new light on the
recent instabilities produced in Eastern Europe by the Warsow pact
dissolution at odd to the previous communist stability. Current Eu-
ropean stability is also discussed with respect to the European Union
construction.
1 Introduction
Twenty years ago, using physics to describe political or social behavior was
a very odd approach. Among very scarce attempts, one paper was calling on
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to the creation of a new field under the name of “Sociophysics” [1]. It stayed
without real continuation. Only in the last years did physicists start to get
involved along this line of research [2]. Among various subjects [3, 4], we
can cite voting process [5, 6], group decision making [7], competing opinion
spreading [8, 9, 10], and very recently international terrorism [11].
In this paper we adress the question of spontaneous coalition forming
within military alliances among a set of independant countries [12, 13, 14]. A
model is built from the complexe physics of spin glasses [15]. While coalitions
are found to form spontaneously, they are unstable. It is only the construc-
tion of extra-territory macro organizations which are able to produce stable
alliances.
The following of the paper is organised as follows. The second part con-
tains the presentation of the model. Basic features of the dynamics of sponta-
neous froming bimodal coalitions are outlined. The building of extra-territory
coaltions is described in Section 3. The cold war situation is then analysed
in Section 4. Section 5 is devoted to the situation in which only one world
coalition is active. A new explanation is given in Section 6 to Eastern Euro-
pean instabilities following the Warsaw pact dissolution as well as to Western
European stability. Some hints are also obtained on how to stabilize these
Eastern Europe instabilities. Last Section contains some concluding remarks.
2 Presentation of the model
We start from a group of N independant countries [12]. From historical,
cultural and economic experience, bilateral propensities Ji,j have emerged
between pairs of countries i and j. They are either favoring cooperation
(Ji,j > 0), conflict (Ji,j < 0) or ignorance (Ji,j = 0). Each propensity
Ji,j depends solely on the pair (i, j) itself. Propensities Ji,j are local and
independant frozen bonds. Respective intensities may vary for each pair of
countries but are always symmetric, i.e., Jij = Jji.
From the well known saying “the enemy of an enemy is a friend” we get the
existence of only two competing coalitions. They are denoted respectively
by A and B. Then each country has the choice to be in either one of two
coalitions. A variable ηi where index i runs from 1 to N, signals the i actual
belonging with ηi = +1 for alliance A and ηi = −1 for alliance B. From
bimodal symmetry all A-members can turn to coalition B with a simultaneous
flip of all B-members to coalition A.
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Given a pair of countries (i, j) their respective alignment is readily ex-
pressed through the product ηiηj . The product is +1 when i and j belong
to the same coalition and −1 otherwise. The associated “cost” between the
countries is measured by the quantity Jijηiηj where Jij accounts for the am-
plitude of exchange which results from their respective geopolitical history
and localization.
Here factorisation over i and j is not possible since we are dealing with
competing bonds [15]. It makes teh problem very hard to solve analytically.
Given a configuration X of countries distributed among coaltions A and B,
for each nation i we can measure its overall degree of conflict and cooperation
with all others N − 1 countries via the quantity,
Ei =
N∑
j=1
Jijηj , (1)
where the summation is taken over all other countries including i itself with
Jii ≡ 0. The product ηiEi then evaluates the “cost” associated with country
i choice with respect to all other country choices. Summing up all country
individual “cost” yields,
E(X) =
1
2
N∑
i=1
ηiEi , (2)
where the 1/2 accounts for the double counting of pairs. This “cost” measures
indeed the level of global satisfaction from the whole country set. It can be
recast as,
E(X) =
1
2
∑
<i,j>
Jijηiηj , (3)
where the sum runs over the N(N − 1) pairs (i, j). At this stage it sounds
reasonable to assume each country chooses its coalition in order to minimize
its indivual cost. Accordingly to make two cooperating countries (Ji,j > 0)
in the same alliance, we put a minus sign in from of the expression of Eq.
(3) to get,
H = −
1
2
∑
<i,j>
Jijηiηj , (4)
which is indeed the Hamiltonian of an Ising random bond magnetic system.
There exist by symmetry 2N/2 distinct sets of alliances each country having
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2 choices for coalition. Starting from any initial configuration, the dynamics
of the system is implemented by single country coalition flips. An country
turns to the competing coalition only if the flip decreases its local cost. The
system has reached its stable state once no more flip occurs. Given {Jij},
the {ηi} are thus obtained minimizing Eq. (4).
Since the system stable configuration minimizes the energy, we are from
the physical viewpoint, at the temperature T = 0. In practise for any finite
system the theory can tell which coalitions are possible. However, if several
coalitions have the same energy, the system is unstable and flips continuously
from one coalition set to another one at random and with no end.
For instance, in the case of three conflicting nations like Israel, Syria and
Iraq, any possible alliance configuration leaves always someone unsatisfied.
Let us label them respectively by 1, 2, 3 and consider equal and negative
exchange interactions J12 = J13 = J23 = −J with J > 0 as shown in Fig.
(1). The associated minimum of the energy is equal to −J . However this
minimum value is realized for several possible and equivalent coalitions which
are respectively (A, B, A), (B, A, A), (A, A, B), (B, A, B), (A, B, B), and
(B, B, A). First three are identical to last ones by symmetry since here what
matters is which countries are together within the same coalition. This pecu-
liar property of a degenerate ground state makes the system unstable. There
exists no one single stable configuration which is stable. Some dynamics is
shown in Fig. (1). The system jumps continuously and at random between
(A, B, A), (B, A, A) and (A, A, B).
To make the dynamics more explicit, consider a given site i. Interactions
with all others sites can be represented by a field,
hi =
N∑
j=1
Jijηj (5)
resulting in an energy contribution
Ei = −ηihi , (6)
to the Hamiltonian H = 1
2
∑N
i=1Ei. Eq. (6) is minimum for ηi and hi having
the same sign. For a given hi there exists always a well defined coalition
choice except for hi = 0. In this case site i is unstable. Then both coalitions
are identical with respect to its local energy which stays equal to zero. An
unstable site flips continuously with probability 1
2
(see Fig. (1)).
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1 2
3
-J: minimum
+J: maximum -J: minimum
A: mixed B: happy
A: mixed
Initial configuration
Unstable
1 2
3
-J: minimum
-J: minimum +J: maximum
A: happy B: mixed
B: mixed
First possibility
for next iteration
1 2
3
+J: maximum
-J: minimum -J: minimum
B: mixed B: mixed
A: happy
Second possibility
for next iteration
1 2
3
+J: maximum
+J: maximum +J: maximum
B: unhappy B: unhappy
B: unhappy
Third possibility
for next iteration
Figure 1: Top left shows one possible configuration of alliances with coun-
tries 1 and 2 in A and country 3 in B. From it, countries 1 and 2 being in
a mixed situation with respect to optimzing their respective bilateral intera-
tions, three possible and equiprobable distributions are possible. In the first
possible following configuration (top right), country 1 has shifted alliance
from A to B. However its move keeps it in its mixed situation while making
country 2 happy and country 3 mixed. Instead it could have been country
2 which had shifted alliance (low right) making 1 happy and 3 mixed. Last
possibility (low left) is both 1 and 2 shifting simultaneously. It is the worse
since each country is unhappy.
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3 Setting up extra territory coalitions
In parallel to the spontaneous emergence of unstable coalitions, some extra
territory organizations have been set in the past to create alliances at a global
world level. Among the recent more powerfull ones stand Nato and the former
Warsow pact. These alliances were set above the country level and produce
economic and military exchanges. Each country is then adjusting to its best
interest with respect to these organisations. A variable ǫi accounts for each
country i natural belonging. For coalition A it is ǫi = +1 and ǫi = −1 for B.
The value ǫi = 0 marks no apriori. These natural belongings are also induced
by cultural and political history.
Exchanges generated by these coalitions produce additional pairwise propen-
sities with amplitudes {Ci,j}. Sharing resources, informations, weapons is
basically profitable when both countries are in the same alliance. However,
being in opposite coalitions produces an equivalent loss. Therefore a pair
(i, j) propensity is ǫiǫjCi,j which can be positive, negative or zero to mark
respective cooperation, conflict or ignorance. It is a site induced bond [?].
Adding it to the former bond propensity yields an overall pair propensity,
Ji,j + ǫiǫjCi,j , (7)
between two countries i and j.
At this stage an additional variable βi = ±1 is introduced to account for
benefit from economic and military pressure attached to a given alignment.
It is still βi = +1 for A and βi = −1 for B with βi = 0 in case of no pressure.
The amplitude of this economical and military interest is measured by a local
positive field bi which also accounts for the country size and its importance.
At this stage, the sets {ǫi} and {βi} are independent.
Actual country choices to cooperate or to conflict result from the given
set of above quantites. The associated total cost becomes,
H = −
1
2
∑
<i,j>
{Ji,j + ǫiǫjCij}ηiηj −
N∑
i=1
βibiηi . (8)
An illustration is given in Fig. (2) with above exemple of Israel, Syria
and Iraq labeled respectively by 1, 2, 3 with J12 = J13 = J23 = −J and
b1 = b2 = b3 = 0. Suppose an arab coalition is set against Israel with
ǫ1 = +1 and ǫ2 = ǫ3 = −1. The new propensities become respectively
−J + C, −J − C, −J − C. They are now minimized by η1 = −η2 = η3 to
gives an energy of −J − C to all three couplings.
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1 2
3
-J: minimum
+J: maximum -J: minimum
A: mixed B: happy
A: mixed
Initial configuration
Unstable
1 2
3
-J-C: minimum
+J-C: minimum -J-C: minimum
A: happy B: happy
A: happy
ε2=1 ε3=−1
ε1=1
New stable configuration
Figure 2: Starting from one possible unstable configuration of alliances (left)
with countries 1 and 2 in A and country 3 in B, the stabilization is shown to
result from the existence of the various ǫ with ǫ1 = ǫ2 = −ǫ3.
4 Cold war scenario
The cold war scenario means that the two existing world level coalitions
generate much stonger couplings than purely bilateral ones, i.e., |Ji,j| < Ci,j
since to belong to a world level coalition produces more advantages than
purely local unproper relationship. Local bond propensities are neutralized
since overwhelmed by the two block site exchanges. The overall system is
very stable. There exists one stable distribution between both competing
alliances.
We consider first the coherent case in which cultural and economical
trends go along the same coalition, i.e., βi = ǫi. Then from Eq. (8) the
minimum of H is unique with all country propensities satisfied. Each coun-
try chooses its coalition according to its natural belonging, i.e., ηi = ǫi. This
result is readily proven via the variable change τ ≡ ǫiηi which turns the
energy to,
H1 = −
1
2
∑
<i,j>
Cijτiτj −
N∑
i=1
biτi . (9)
Above Hamiltonian representd a ferromagnetic Ising Hamiltonian in positive
symmetry breaking fields bi. Indeed it has one unique minimum with all
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τi = +1.
The remarkable result here is that the existence of two apriori world level
coalitions is identical to the case of a unique coalition with every country in
it. It shed light on the stability of the Cold War situation where each country
satisfies its proper relationship. Differences and conflicts appear to be part
of an overall cooperation within this scenario.
The dynamics for one unique coalition including every country, or two
competing alliances, is the same since what matters is the existence of a well
defined stable configuration. However there exists a difference which is not
relevant at this stage of the model since we assumed Ji,j = 0. In reality
Ji,j 6= 0 makes the existence of two coalitions to produce a lower “energy”
than a unique coalition since then, more Ji,j can also be satisfied.
It worth to notice that field terms biǫiηi account for the difference in
energy cost in breaking a pair proper relationship for respectively a large
and a small country. Consider for instance two countries i and j with bi =
2bj = 2b0. Associated pair energy is
Hij ≡ −Cijǫiηiǫjηj − 2b0ǫiηi − b0ǫjηj . (10)
Conditions ηi = ǫi and ηj = ǫj give the minimum energy,
Hmij = −Jij − 2b0 − b0 . (11)
From Eq. (11) it is easily seen that in case j breaks proper alignment shifting
to ηj = −ǫj the cost in energy is 2Jij+2b0. In parallel when i shifts to ηi = −ǫi
the cost is higher with 2Jij + 4b0. Therfore the cost in energy is lower for
a breaking from proper alignment by the small country (bj = b0) than by
the large country (bj = 2b0). In the real world, it is clearly not the same for
instance for the US to be against Argentina than to Argentina to be against
the US.
We now consider the uncoherent case in which cultural and economical
trends may go along opposite coalitions, i.e., βi 6= ǫi. Using above variable
change τ ≡ ǫiηi, the Hamiltonian becomes,
H2 = −
1
2
∑
<i,j>
Jijτiτj −
N∑
i=1
δibiτi , (12)
where δi ≡ βiǫi is given and equal to ±1. H2 is formally identical to the
ferromagnetic Ising Hamiltonian in random fields ±bi.
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The local field term δibiτi modifies the country field hi in Eq. (9) to
hi + δibi which now can happen to be zero. This change is qualitative since
now there exists the possibility to have “unstability”, i.e., zero local effec-
tive field coupled to the individual choice. Moreover countries which have
opposite cultural and economical trends may now follow their economical in-
terest against their cultural interest or vice versa. Two qualitatively different
situations may occur.
• Unbalanced economical power: in this case we have
∑N
i δibi 6= 0.
The symmetry is now broken in favor of one of the coalition. But still
there exists only one minimum.
• Balanced economical power: in this case we have
∑N
i δibi = 0.
Symmetry is preserved and H2 is identical to the ferromagnetic Ising
Hamiltonian in random fields which has one unique minimum.
5 Unique world leader
Very recently the Eastern block has disappeared. However it the Western
block is still active as before. In this model, within our notations, denoting
A the Western alignment, we have still ǫi = +1 for countries which had
ǫi = +1. On the opposite, countries which had ǫi = −1 have now turned to
either ǫi = +1 if joining Nato or to ǫi = 0 otherwise.
Therefore above Ji,j = 0 assumption based on the inequality |Ji,j| <
|ǫiǫj |Ci,j no longer holds for each pair of countries. In particular propensity
pi,j become equal to Ji,j in all cases where ǫi = 0, ǫj = 0 and ǫi = ǫj = 0.
A new distribution of countries results from the collapse of one block.
On the one hand A coalition countries still determine their actual choices
between themselves according to Ci,j. On the other hand former B coalition
countries are now determining their choices according to competing links Ji,j
which did not automatically agree with former Ci,j.
This subset of countries has turned from a random site spin glasses with-
out frustration into a random bond spin glasses with frustration. The former
B coalition subset has jumped from one stable minimum to a highly degen-
erated unstable landscape with many local minima. This property could be
related to the fragmentation process where ethnic minorities and states are
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shifting rapidly allegiances back and forth while they were formerly part of
a stable structure just few years ago.
While the B coalition world organization has disappeared, the A coalition
world organization did not change and is still active. The condition |Ji,j| <
Ci,j is still valid for A pair of countries with ǫiǫj = +1. Associated countries
thus maintain a stable relationship and avoid a fragmentation process. This
result supports a posteriori argument against the dissolution of Nato once
Warsaw Pact was disolved. It also favors the viewpoint that former Warsaw
Pact countries should now join Nato.
Above situation could also shed some light on the current European de-
bate. It would mean European stability is mainly the result of the existence
of European structures with economical reality and not the outcome of a
new friendship among former ennemies. These structures produce associated
propensities Ci,j much stronger than local competing propensities Ji,j which
are still there. European stability would indeed result from Ci,j > |Ji,j| and
not from all having Ji,j > 0. An eventual setback in the European con-
struction (ǫiǫjCi,j = 0) would then automatically produce a fragmentation
process analogous of what happened in former Yugoslavia with the activation
of ancestral bilateral local conflicts.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a new way to describe alliance forming phe-
nomena among a set of countries. It was shown that within our model the
cold war stabilty was not the result of two opposite alliances but rather the
existence of alliances which neutralize the conflicting interactions within al-
lies. It means also that having two alliances or just one is qualitatively the
same with respect to stability.
From this viewpoint the strong instabilies which resulted from the Warsow
pact dissolution are given a simple explanation. Simultaneously some hints
are obtained about possible policies to stabilize world nation relationships.
Along this line, the importance of European construction was also underlined.
At this stage, our model remains rather basic. However it opens some new
road to explore and to forecast international policies.
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